The Proposed Constitution of Kenya – 6 May 2010 – Published by AG

Download The Proposed Constitution of Kenya – 6 May 2010 – by AG

One can also get the proposed constitution on mobile phone:

www.katiba.me

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Waki Report – Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)

Waki Report – Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)
Executive Summary
The mandate of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)
was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the
conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and to make
recommendations concerning these and other matters.
The Report comprises 5 Parts. Part I of the Report is an Introduction which
discusses the historical context of the violence; Part II is a narration of the
violence province by province. Part III deals with four cross cutting issues:
sexual violence, internally displaced persons, the media and the nature and
impact of the violence. Part IV deals with acts and omissions of state security
agencies and impunity; and Part V contains recommendations made with a view
to the prevention of future reoccurrence of large scale violence; the investigation
of alleged perpetrators; and how to tackle the culture of impunity that has
become the hallmark of violence and other crimes in the country.
Sadly, violence has been a part of Kenya’s electoral processes since the
restoration of multi party politics in 1991. However, the violence that shook
Kenya after the 2007 general elections was unprecedented. It was by far the
most deadly and the most destructive violence ever experienced in Kenya. Also,
unlike previous cycles of election related violence, much of it followed, rather
than preceded elections. The 2007-2008 post-election violence was also more
widespread than in the past. It affected all but 2 provinces and was felt in both
urban and rural parts of the country. Previously violence around election periods
concentrated in a smaller number of districts mainly in Rift Valley, Western, and
Coast Provinces.
As regards the conduct of state security agencies, they failed institutionally to
anticipate, prepare for, and contain the violence. Often individual members of
the state security agencies were also guilty of acts of violence and gross
violations of the human rights of the citizens.
In some ways the post-election violence resembled the ethnic clashes of the
1990s and was but an episode in a trend of institutionalization of violence in
Kenya over the years. The fact that armed militias, most of whom developed as a
result of the 1990s ethnic clashes, were never de-mobilized led to the ease with
which political and business leaders reactivated them for the 2007 post-election
violence. Secondly, the increasing personalization of power around the
presidency continues to be a factor in facilitating election related violence.
The widespread belief that the presidency brings advantages for the President’s
ethnic group makes communities willing to exert violence to attain and keep
power. Inequalities and economic marginalization, often viewed in ethnogeographic
terms, were also very much at play in the post-election violence in
places like the slum areas of Nairobi.
One of the main findings of the Commission’s investigations is that the postelection
violence was spontaneous in some geographic areas and a result of
planning and organization in other areas, often with the involvement of
politicians and business leaders. Some areas witnessed a combination of the two
forms of violence, where what started as a spontaneous violent reaction to the
perceived rigging of elections later evolved into well organized and coordinated
attacks on members of ethnic groups associated with the incumbent president or
the PNU party. This happened where there was an expectation that violence was
inevitable whatever the results of the elections.
The report concludes that the post-election violence was more than a mere
juxtaposition of citizens-to-citizens opportunistic assaults. These were
systematic attacks on Kenyans based on their ethnicity and their political
leanings. Attackers organized along ethnic lines, assembled considerable
logistical means and traveled long distances to burn houses, maim, kill and
sexually assault their occupants because these were of particular ethnic groups
and political persuasion. Guilty by association was the guiding force behind
deadly “revenge” attacks, with victims being identified not for what they did but
for their ethnic association to other perpetrators. This free-for-all was made

possible by the lawlessness stemming from an apparent collapse of state
institutions and security forces.
In general, the police were overwhelmed by the massive numbers of the attackers
and the relatively effective coordination of the attacks. However, in most parts of
the country affected by the violence, failure on the part of the Kenya Police and
the Provincial Administration to act on intelligence and other early warning signs
contributed to the escalation of the violence.
The post-election violence is also the story of lack of preparedness of, and poor
coordination among, different state security agencies. While the National
Security Intelligence Service seemed to possess actionable intelligence on the
likelihood of violence in many parts of the country, it was not clear whether and
through which channel such intelligence was shared with operational security
agencies. The effectiveness of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration
Police was also negatively affected by the lack of clear policing operational
procedures and by political expediency’s adverse impact on their policing
priorities.
The report recommends concrete measures to improve performance and
accountability of state security agencies and coordination within the state
security mechanism, including strengthening joint operational preparedness
arrangements; developing comprehensive operational review processes; merging
the two police agencies; and establishing an Independent Police Complaints
Authority.
To break the cycle of impunity which is at the heart of the post-election violence,
the report recommends the creation of a special tribunal with the mandate to
prosecute crimes committed as a result of post-election violence. The tribunal
will have an international component in the form of the presence of non-Kenyans
on the senior investigations and prosecution staff.

CIPEV Website

Download Full Waki Report – DialogueKenya

Kreigler Report – Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007

Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007

Kreigler Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On 30 December 2007, following announcement of the presidential election results,
violence broke out in several places across Kenya amid claims that the Electoral
Commission of Kenya (ECK) had rigged the presidential election. Sporadic eruptions
continued for many weeks, bringing death and destruction to thousands of Kenyans. An
African Union-sponsored Panel of Eminent African Personalities led by former United
Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan brokered a settlement which heralded a
government of national unity between the main political parties and a common
commitment to urgent constitutional reform. The settlement included the appointment of
two commissions, one to examine the violence and the other, the Independent Review
Commission (IREC), to examine the December 2007 Kenyan elections from various
perspectives.
In conformity with its terms of reference (ToRs) IREC now presents its findings and
recommendations, based on its analysis of the legal framework for the conduct of
elections in Kenya, the structure, composition and management system of the ECK and
its organisation and conduct of the 2007 electoral operations. The report specifically
examines the integrity of the whole electoral process, from voter registration and
nomination of candidates through voting, counting, transmission and tallying to dispute
resolution and post-election procedures, deals with the role of political parties, observers,
the media, civil society and the public at large, and comments on the independence,
capacity and functional efficiency of the ECK.
Main findings
Kenya’s constitutional and legal framework relating to elections contains a number of
weaknesses and inconsistencies that weaken its effectiveness. This legislation needs
urgent and radical revision, including consolidation.
The electoral management process as a whole needs revision
During the preparation and conduct of the 2007 elections the ECK lacked the necessary
independence, capacity and functionality because of weaknesses in its organisational
structure, composition, and management systems.
The institutional legitimacy of the ECK and public confidence in the professional
credibility of its commissioners and staff have been gravely and arguably irreversibly
impaired. It lacks functional efficiency and is incapable of properly discharging its
mandate.
The conduct of the electoral process was hampered and the electoral environment was
polluted by the conduct of many public participants, especially political parties and the
media.
There were serious defects in the voter register which impaired the integrity of the 2007
elections even before polling started:
• it excluded nearly one-third of eligible voters, with a bias against women and
young people
• it included the names of some 1.2 million dead people
Serious anomalies in the delimitation of constituencies impaired the legitimacy of the
electoral process even before polling started.
There was generalised abuse of polling, characterised by widespread bribery, votebuying,
intimidation and ballot-stuffing.
This was followed by grossly defective data collation, transmission and tallying, and
ultimately the electoral process failed for lack of adequate planning, staffselection/
training, public relations and dispute resolution.
The integrity of the process and the credibility of the results were so gravely impaired by
these manifold irregularities and defects that it is irrelevant whether or not there was
actual rigging at the national tally centre. The results are irretrievably polluted.
Main recommendations
All political role-players in Kenya should recognise that materially defective elections
accompanied by public violence will remain a feature of life in their country absent a
concerted and sustained commitment to electoral integrity by all Kenyans.
Radically reform the ECK, or create a new electoral management body (EMB), with a
new name, image and ethos, committed to administrative excellence in the service of
electoral integrity, composed of a lean policy-making and supervisory board, selected in a
transparent and inclusive process, interacting with a properly structured professional
secretariat.
Devise, implement and maintain appropriate executive, legislative and political measures
to enable the reconstituted or new EMB to initiate, popularise and sustain a national
commitment to electoral integrity and respect for the inalienable franchise rights of
Kenyan citizens.
Empower the EMB, by means of executive, legislative and political measures properly to
perform the essential functions entrusted to it under sections 42 and 42A of the
Constitution (delimitation and the conduct of elections and associated activities).
Adopt a new voter registration system.
Agree (as part of the constitutional review process) on an electoral system, which puts to
rest the continuous discussion about a new electoral system for Kenya.
Choose and implement the necessary constitutional and other legal amendments to give
effect to whichever of IREC’s recommendations are accepted.
Minority Opinion
Two members of the Commission held a dissenting view on some of the findings
reported in Chapter 6. Their opinions are presented in italics at the end of each of the
relevant paragraphs.

View Full Report – Dialogue Kenya

MINUTES OF THE CCP MEETING – 13/06/08

MINUTES OF THE CCP MEETING HELD AT OXFAM OFFICES, SHELTER AFRIQUE HOUSE ON 13/06/08

MEMBERS PRESENT


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Matters Arising

1. CCP on KBC radio & KBC television

KBC radio and KBC television have agreed to host 4 people (2 for radio & 2 for TV) from CCP in an interactive programme. The following topics have been suggested for discussion; Resettlement, Amnesty, and Peace-building.

Action

The sub-committee will approach available CCP core group members to see whether they can host the show. Concerned Kenyan Writers are willing to avail one or two people to accompany CCP during the show.

2. Conflict Sensitive Journalism

The radio stations especially the vernacular ones need to be sensitive when reporting on post election violence issues. They need to practise responsible journalism and exercise restraint when dealing with sensitive issues.

There is no feedback yet from the Media Council or Media Owner’s Association, however the Ministry of Information is waiting for the ICT Bill to be debated in parliament before they can enforce any media laws.

3. Nation wide Prayer meeting

‘Healing Day’ is the name that was suggested for the nation wide prayer meeting day. The committee will work on a budget and programme for the day and CCP will handle the high profile invites.

Action

August 3rd is the tentative date suggested the Nation wide prayer meeting. The committee will hold a larger meeting on the 25th of June where various stakeholders will be present, and as such they are appealing for a meeting venue for this day (50 pax).

4. Kenya Veterans for Peace Continue reading

MINUTES OF THE CCP MEETING – 06/06/08

MINUTES OF THE CCP MEETING HELD AT OXFAM OFFICES, SHELTER AFRIQUE HOUSE ON 06/06/08

MEMBERS PRESENT

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Matters Arising

1. CCP on KBC radio & KBC television

KBC radio and KBC television have agreed to host 4 people (2 for radio & 2 for TV) from CCP in an interactive programme. The following topics have been suggested for discussion; Resettlement, Amnesty, and Peace-building.

Action

The sub-committee will follow on the names of the 4 participants for the 2 shows. An appropriate date for the shows should also be established (Rev. Mathenge, Rev. Peter, Dr. Mwiti & Sally)

2. Conflict Sensitive Journalism

The radio stations especially the vernacular ones need to be sensitive when reporting on post election violence issues. They need to practise responsible journalism and exercise restraint when dealing with sensitive issues.

Action

To find out what the Media council and the Media Owners’ Association are doing about this (Annette)

3. Nation wide Prayer meeting Continue reading

AMREF – Responding to crisis: Lessons from Kenya’s silent emergency

Responding to crisis: Lessons from Kenya’s silent emergency


AMREF’s Deputy-Director General, Dr Florence Muli-Musiime has warned that emergency institutions, both local and international, risk misdirecting their humanitarian crisis response if they are not sensitive to community dynamics that are not always visible in times of upheaval. In a powerful message to hundreds of delegates at the 35th Global Health Council Conference taking place in Washington DC, Dr Muli-Musiime described a ‘silent emergency’ that nobody spoke about following the post-election violence in Kenya, whose implications for healing and recovery has more serious implications for post-conflict health and social development than the more widely publicised plight of internally displaced people in the country.

‘When the crisis broke out,’ she said, ‘the focus of the health system was to mitigate the physical injuries, while that of the donor community and emergency institutions was on the Internally Displaced People. But we realised that there was a silent emergency which none of the two groups was looking at – that of thousands of people who were caught up in their own homes, unable to go to IDP camps because they would have had to go through hostile territory to get there, and unable to access health or any other basic services. To make matters worse, they were physically assaulted and sexually abused in their own homes.’

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OCHA Kenya Humanitarian Update vol. 21, 21-27 May 2008

OCHA Kenya Humanitarian Update vol. 21, 21-27 May 2008


HIGHLIGHTS

– Representative of the Secretary General emphasizes the need to ensure sustainability of the returns and resettlement process.

– Over two thirds of IDPs have left camps and 123 camps have closed since January.

– 84,752 IDPs remain in camps and over 53,330 IDPs settle in transit camps.

– Aid agencies report funding gaps for proposed projects; only 31.8% of the EHRP funded.

The information contained in this report has been compiled by OCHA from information received from the field, from national and international humanitarian partners and from other official sources. It does not represent a position from the United Nations.

I. General Overview

The Ministry of Planning released the Economic Survey for 2008, which reflected a grim economic situation, beleaguered by increased inflation and slowing economic growth. Economic growth is now estimated to have declined to 3.5-4.5% in 2008 whilst the Survey noted that the post-election violence (PEV) had caused USD 3.7 billion in damages and agriculture productivity had declined by 8.1% from the 2007-2008 fiscal year. Meanwhile, the bill for oil imports increased by 18.8% in the past year, further constraining domestic production with higher input costs. Furthermore, the World Bank was cited to have estimated that five million more Kenyans have been impoverished as a result of PEV. In light of these poor indicators, the key determinates of economic recovery outlined in the Survey, included the country’s ability to achieve the following: political stability, rehabilitation of infrastructure damaged in the PEV, construction of new infrastructure and increased regional economic integration in the East Africa Community.

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